Today is the 85th Anniversary of the Pepper Hill
Fire in the Elk State Forest here in Pennsylvania where 7 enrollees from the Civilian
Conservation Corps and a forestry foreman lost their lives. The remaining crew
was severely burned.
“In all, the fire claimed eight lives: Gilbert Mahoney 38,
Ridgeway, was the first to perish; Basil Bogush, 19, Conemaugh, John Boring,
19, Johnstown, Howard May, 18, Erie, and Andrew Stefphanic, 18, Twin Rocks, all
died in the fire. Ross Hollobaugh, 18, Rimersburg, died the next day in Renovo;
Stephen Jacofsky, 17, Johnstown died the next day at St. Marys Hospital; George
Vogel, hometown unknown, died November 2, in Renovo” (Overview
of the Pepper Hill Fire of 1938).
Let’s take a moment to consider the conditions that led to
this fire. Some of you may or may not already know that most of north-central
Pennsylvania had been heavily logged from 1890-1930, this meant that by 1938
much of that area was very young second-growth hardwoods, shrubs, and leftover
logging slash. Keeping this in mind, 1938 was an unusually hot, dry summer
followed by a killing frost on October 7. That frost caused the foliage to cure
and precipitation over the previous three months was significantly below normal,
meanwhile, temperatures had persisted in the 80s with the average relative
humidity sitting at 20-25% (National Wildfire Coordinating Group).
I’m going to pull directly from the NWCG 6 Minutes for
Safety “This Day in Wildland Fire History” for the base summary of what
happened that day:
“At 1110 on October 19, 1938, the Hunts Run Civilian Conservation Corp (CCC) Camp #S-132 was notified of a possible forest fire. Upon investigation, several fires were located on Pepper Hill Mountain. Two CCC crews were dispatched to the fires. Both crews had just returned from a fire only hours before, and many enrollees requested to stay behind due to fatigue. All enrollees were ordered to go. The two CCC crews began initial attack from both flanks of the fire, anchoring into a nearby road. Both crews began constructing line from the heel of the fire to the top, burning out as needed. For reasons which are still not clear, crew #2 was ordered to abandon their firing operation on the right flank and proceed to the head of the fire to construct direct downhill line. The crew was ¾ of the way up Pepper Hill Mountain when the fire below made a rapid run that overtook them. A few were able to find safety atop large nearby rocks.”
How the story unfolds is best told by one of the survivors, Pete Damico. Here is his story from the files of the Historical Society:
"It was the morning of October 19, 1938. The torrid sun
relentlessly beat down its wave of heat and light, literally scorching the
forests about Sinnamahoning, as if intentionally igniting the spark of
destruction that was to follow. We had returned a few hours earlier from
fighting a small forest fire and were getting a brief rest. At noon the fire
gong once again sounded through-out the camp. We jumped out of bed, back into
denims and rushed to the mess-hall for dinner, before going to the
"fire-front." Following a hurried lunch, I placed a fire tank on my
back, and with eighteen other fellows was off on the greatest adventure of my
life. Little did we dream of the tragedy that lurked on Pepper Hill Mountain.
Arriving at the ‘front’ we began cleaning a path at the foot of the mountain.
After progressing about fifty feet and starting a back fire, we were ordered to
go to the head of the fire and work downhill. About three-fourths of the way to
the top, nine of us fellows (the others had gone ahead) stopped to take a rest;
one of the lads biting into a sandwich he had hidden in his shirt. Looking back
he screamed, dropped his sandwich and then fainted. Waves upon waves of red and
yellow flames, only a hundred feet away, were eating their way to the top of
Pepper Hill --- ready in a few seconds to devour us. Instantly the picture of
the back fire we had ignited at the foot of the hill flashed through my mind;
it has jumped the path and, driven by a fresh wind, had taken to the trees and
madly charged toward us. To run ahead of the flames was futile; they would
easily catch us. On the three remaining sides the red headless monster leaped
and laughed as they threw heavenward showers of sparks and clouds of smoke and
came fatally closer. SMOKE! SPARKS! FLAMES! FLESH! I dropped my tank shut my
eyes, mumbled a short prayer and ran directly into the face of the back fire.
In semi-daze I dragged my weary feet and burned body until completely fatigued;
scorched and parched with thirst, I fell exhausted at the foot of a tree. A
long time later, it seemed like eternity, I regained consciousness, hearing one
of my buddies screaming at the top of his voice, as though his lungs were about
to 5 Photo Courtesy of Dan LeCrone, PA DCNR burst, lying only five feet away
from me. He was terribly burned; I could scarcely recognize him. A hundred feet
away another of the crew was lying on the ground, his face buried in the earth.
The fire was dying. With my two companions we began trudging back to the road.
After several short steps, one, whose clothing was entirely burned off him,
dropped naked and exhausted. Could we carry him? Help him? We tried, but his
listless body weighted tons. After a few attempts we had no alternative but to
attempt to get through ourselves. Reaching the road, I frantically quenched my
thirst with water from the kegs carried on the truck. With a passing motorist
we rode to the Bucktail Veterans Camp and then, minutes later, was raced in an
ambulance to the Renovo Hospital. After three weeks in Renovo, I was moved to
the Walter Reed Hospital in Washington, D. C. where I was a patient for two
months. Receiving my discharge, I went back to the Hunts Run Camp and was on
quarters for the following month. A few weeks later, still bearing scars on
both hands and legs, I was transferred to Camp S-125, Elimsport, PA, to attend
the Central Shop School, where I am at present. Of that fire crew of nine men,
six perished in the flames, one lived one day, another two weeks--- only I was
fortunate enough to survive the disaster. Never does a day pass that I fail to
thank Providence for my extremely good fortune --- to have seen death face to
face and lived.”
From Left to Right:
Basil Bogush and Andy Richnafsky.
Andy survived the fire and attended the
70th Anniversary of the Pepper Hill Fire. |
On March 15, 1939, disciplinary action for the staff of the
Hunts Run CCC Camp was recommended after deliberation following the
investigation of the events at the Pepper Hill Fire. Two of them received 30
days leave without pay, one was demoted from superintendent to foreman and the
last was dismissed altogether. This direction came directly from the U.S.
Secretary of Agriculture at the time.
Now, I’d like to add some discussion points from the NWCG
website for you to consider, by yourself or with your crew, etc. You are also
welcome to answer them in the comments to spark discussion here.
Training – Most of the enrollees received little
or no formal training. They were expected to learn what to do on the job.
- Most of us will work with new firefighters who have little or no experience. It is not reasonable or safe to assume they will learn everything on the fireline. How will your crew prepare new members for success?
Fatigue – Many of the enrollees assigned to the
Pepper Hill Fire had just returned to camp from other fires at 0530 that
morning.
- Though we now have work/rest guidelines to help prevent fatigue, a long fire season can still take its toll on even the fittest firefighter. What signs might we see in our crew members that could indicate fatigue?
- What impact can fatigue have on your crew, and what can you do to lessen the associated risks?
Tactics – The original plan to use the road as
an anchor point seems sound, but poor choices were made on the right flank when
the crew moved to the head and abandoned their burnout.
- Without aviation support, would your crew engage this fire? If so, how?
- Though not a sound decision at Pepper Hill, describe conditions where, while ensuring safety, attacking the head of a fire could be a viable tactic.
Crew Cohesion – The CCC Enrollees had not worked
many fires together. On their way up the hill, they became separated due
to differences in physical ability. There were no indications that their
crew leader gave them any direction during this critical time.
- No firefighter intends to get into a bad situation. We all train to avoid them, but what if? How would you and your crew manage the safety of all firefighters if faced with a similar situation?